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ENFORCING JUDGMENTS ABROAD:
REFLECTIONS ON THE DESIGN OF
RECOGNITION CONVENTIONS
Arthur T. von Mehren*
I. REGULATION OF ADJUDICATORY AUTHORITY IN
INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS
A. The Design of Conventions Addressing Private
International Law Topics
Traditionally, private international law conventions have
addressed a single subject matter, either choice of law or recog-
nition and enforcement of foreign judgments (aside from some
very general provisions in bilateral treaties of friendship and
commerce, jurisdiction to adjudicate has not been directly regu-
lated by international instruments).1 In their design, these
conventions were one dimensional. Theoretically, private inter-
national law conventions could, however, be one, two, or even
three dimensional in character. For which-if any-areas of
private international law does a multi-dimensional approach
offer advantages over a uni-dimensional one?
In choice of law a one-dimensional approach is preferable
for theoretical as well as practical reasons. Generally speaking,
a forum's choice-of-law rules and principles depend neither
upon the basis on which adjudicatory authority is claimed nor
upon the prospects for the resulting judgment's enforcement
abroad. Moreover, since enforcement may be appropriate in
several states, each of which holds different views respecting
choice-of-law methodologies and solutions, great difficulties
would be encountered-at least in multilateral conventions-in
linking closely choice of law with either jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate or recognition and enforcement. To the extent that a legal
* Joseph Story Professor of Law, Emeritus, Harvard University.
1. The first international instrument to regulate broadly jurisdiction to adju-
dicate in the international sense is the 1968 Brussels Convention. Convention on
Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters,
Sept. 27, 1968, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32 [hereinafter Brussels Convention] (for the
consolidated, current text of this convention see 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1, reprinted in
29 I.L.M. 1413).
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order takes specific choice-of-law rules into account in deciding
whether to enforce a foreign judgment, an indirect control by
imposing a choice-of-law test for recognition suffices. Little
would be gained by regulating directly the State of origin's
choice-of-law rule or methodology so far as these are employed
for that State's own purposes or affect possible enforcement in
third states. Accordingly, neither a three-dimensional conven-
tion nor a two-dimensional one dealing directly with choice of
law and either jurisdiction to adjudicate or recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is practical.
A two-dimensional approach is, however, feasible where
jurisdiction to adjudicate and recognition of foreign judgments
are in question. A symbiotic relationship, practically and theo-
retically speaking, exists between adjudicatory authority and
enforcement of foreign judgments; recognition conventions
almost invariably impose a jurisdictional test. Should these
two problem areas be addressed separately or together, in a
simple or a double convention?
This issue is raised by the decision of the Hague Confer-
ence on Private International Law, at its Eighteenth Session in
October, 1996, "to include in the Agenda of the Nineteenth
Session [in October, 2000] the question of jurisdiction, and
recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil and
commercial matters."2
The considerations that support the Conference's decision
to use the two-dimensional design are discussed below.3 Before
considering the form that a two-dimensional convention-a
2. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 18th
Session, Oct. 19, 1996, at B1 (emphasis added).
The project on which the Hague Conference has begun work is discussed in
some detail in Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition of United States Judgments
Abroad and Foreign Judgments in the United States: Would an International Con-
vention Be Useful?, 57 RABELSZ 449, 449-59 (1993); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recog-
nition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: A New Approach for the Hague
Conference?, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271, 271-87 (1994) [hereinafter von
Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments]; and Arthur T. von
Mehren, The Case for a Convention-mixte Approach to Jurisdiction to Adjudicate
and Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 61 RABELSZ 86, 86-92
(1997). For general background, see also Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and
Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments: Reflections on General Theory and Current
Practice in the European Economic Community and in the United States, 81
COLUM. L. REV. 1044, 1044-60 (1981) [hereinafter von Mehren, Recognition and
Enforcement of Sister-State Judgments].
3. See discussion infra Parts H.A and H.B.
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double convention (convention double), in the broad sense of
the term-might take, the two basic variants are discussed:
the full fledged or complete double convention (convention
double) and the mixed convention (convention mixte).
B. Double Conventions: The Two Basic Variants
The distinguishing characteristic of a full-fledged double
convention is that the courts of each Contracting State are,
subject perhaps to a limited forum non conveniens exception,4
required to decide cases brought before them on a jurisdictional
basis prescribed by the convention but must otherwise refrain
from adjudicating on the merits. In litigations within a double
convention's scope, either the matter proceeds on a convention-
prescribed basis and a judgment entitled to recognition and
enforcement results or the proceeding is aborted for lack of
adjudicatory authority and a judgment on the merits cannot be
given. In a pure double convention, all jurisdictional bases not
required are prohibited. Each Contracting State is required to
make available and, subject perhaps to minor qualifications, to
exercise certain bases of jurisdiction in the international sense.
Only these required bases can be invoked-permitted bases
that are not required have no place-and all resulting judg-
ments are, subject to rare exceptions, enforceable in the other
Contracting States.
A mixed convention differs from a pure double convention
in that it divides bases of adjudicatory authority into
three-rather than two-groups: (1) required bases that each
Contracting State must make available if the litigation falls
within the scope of the convention and whose use results in
judgments entitled, in principle, to recognition and enforce-
ment under the convention; (2) permitted bases that a Con-
tracting State is not forbidden to use but whose use results in
judgments whose enforceability vel non is determined, as has
traditionally been the case internationally, under the State
addressed's general law of recognition and enforcement; (3)
prohibited bases that a Contracting State is not entitled to
invoke in litigation that is within the scope of the convention.
4. The duty to exercise adjudicatory authority when a required jurisdictional
basis is present can also be qualified by convention rules respecting lis pendens or
by exclusive jurisdiction requirements.
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C. Are Brussels and Lugano Pure Double Conventions?
No example exists of a pure--or true-double convention.'
It is often-and incorrectly-assumed that two regional con-
ventions-Brussels (1968) and Lugano6 (1988)-are true dou-
ble conventions. Article 3 of each convention does provide that
"Persons domiciled in a Contracting State may be sued in the
courts of another Contracting State only by virtue of the rules
set out in Sections 2-6 of... Title [II Jurisdiction]." The con-
ventions would be purely double in character had they regulat-
ed directly not only the assumption of adjudicatory authority
over defendants domiciled in a Contracting State but also over
those not so domiciled.
Where nondomiciliary defendants are concerned, Brussels
and Lugano function as simple or single conventions (conven-
tions simples), albeit of a most radical type. Article 4, para-
graph one, provides that "[i]f the defendant is not domiciled in
a Contracting State, the jurisdiction of the courts of each Con-
tracting State shall, subject to the provisions of Article 16
[providing for exclusive jurisdiction], be determined by the law
of that State," not by the convention.8 Pursuant to Article 26 of
Title III, Recognition and Enforcement, such judgments "[s]hall
be recognized in the other Contracting States ... .' To clinch
the matter, Article 28 goes on to provide that, subject to cer-
tain exceptions irrelevant for present purposes, "the jurisdic-
tion of the court of the State of origin may not be reviewed; the
test of public policy referred to in... Article 27(1) may not be
5. One international instrument-the New York Convention-employs the
duality principle in approaching recognition problems. Its Article H regulates the
adjudicatory authority of arbitral tribunals and Articles III through V govern rec-
ognition and enforcement of the resulting awards. See Convention on the Recogni-
tion and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, done June 10, 1958, arts. II-V,
21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force with respect to the United
States Dec. 29, 1970). Inasmuch as arbitral authority rests on a single ba-
sis-party agreement-regulation of the jurisdictional issue is far less complex and
controversial than where the adjudicatory authority of courts is in question.
6. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters,, Sept. 16, 1988, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, reprinted in 28 LL.M.
620 [hereinafter Lugano Convention].
7. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 3; Lugano Convention, supra note
6, art. 3 (closely parallel language).
8. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 4 (emphasis added); Lugano Con-
vention, supra note 6, art. 4.
9. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 26; Lugano Convention, supra note
6, art. 26.
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applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction."'
Where defendants not domiciled in a Contracting State are
in the picture-certainly a phenomenon that is not purely
theoretical, Brussels and Lugano thus represent a radical form
of the convention simple. Previously, all one-dimensional recog-
nition conventions had imposed jurisdictional tests; the judg-
ment had to satisfy a requirement designed to assure that the
court of origins assertion of adjudicatory authority satisfied
minimum standards of fairness and justice. Under traditional
recognition conventions, judgments resting on many of the
"exorbitant" bases of jurisdiction catalogued in Article 3, para-
graph 2, of the Brussels and Lugano conventions would be
denied recognition and enforcement except-perhaps-in situa-
tions where the court addressed would itself employ the basis
in question." Brussels and Lugano give instead the State of
origin complete control over the jurisdictional bases that it
chooses to use where nondomiciliary defendants are concerned
and then requires essentially automatic recognition and en-
forcement of the resulting judgment by other Contracting States.'2
10. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 28; Lugano Convention, supra note
6, art. 28 (closely parallel language).
11. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 3; Lugano Convention, supra note
6, art. 3.
12. Under Article 59, however, Contracting States can assume,
in a convention on the recognition and enforcement of judgments, an
obligation towards a third State not to recognize judgments given in
other Contracting States against defendants domiciled or habitually resi-
dent in the third State where, in cases provided for in Article 4, the
judgment could only be founded on a ground of jurisdiction specified in
the tecond paragraph of Article 3 [the so-called "exorbitant" bases of
jurisdiction].
Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 59; Lugano Convention, supra note 6, art.
59.
The remedy provided by Article 59 is both incomplete and difficult to put
into effect. Third States are required to negotiate recognition and enforcement
conventions with Brussels and Lugano States, which often may be feasible, if at
all, only through long, bilateral negotiations. In all events, very little use has been
made of Article 59.
Two conventions taking advantage of the article came into force in 1977: A
bilateral convention of June 17, 1977 between Germany and Norway; and a mul-
tilateral convention of October 11, 1977 between Norway, Denmark, Finland, Ice-
land, and Sweden. Both were rendered obsolete by the Lugano Convention.
More recently, both the United Kingdom and France have negotiated with
Canada bilateral conventions that utilize Article 59. The Convention Between the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Canada Providing For
the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial
BROOK. J. 7VT'L L. [Vol. XX=Y:1
To this regime, one exception is made; a tinge of duality is
introduced that makes matters worse. The second paragraph of
Article 4 provides that:
As against... a defendant [not domiciled in a Contracting
State], any person domiciled in a Contracting State may,
whatever his nationality, avail himself in that State of the
rules of jurisdiction there in force, and in particular those
specified in the second paragraph of Article 3 [the so-called
"exorbitant bases'], in the same way as the nationals of that
State."
It hardly exaggerates to characterize "this aspect [Article
3, paragraph two, and Article 4, paragraph two] of the Brus-
sels [and Lugano] Convention[s] ... [as] the single most re-
Matters, Apr. 24, 1984, 1988 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 74 (Cmd. 519), came into effect on
January 1, 1987. See Reciprocal Enforcement of Foreign Judgments (Canada) Order
1987, S.I. 1987 No. 468. The Convention, in English and French texts, is set out
in the Schedule to the Order and in the Canada United Kingdom Civil and Com-
mercial Judgments Convention Act, R.S.C., ch. C-30, sched. (1985) (Can.). The
Convention was amended by an .exchange of Notes in 1995 to include a reference
to the Lugano Convention in Articles I, H(1), and IX(1). See UK Reciprocal En-
forcement of Foreign Judgments (Canada) (Amendment) Order 1995, S.I. 1995 No.
2708. At present, the Convention does not apply in Quebec and the two Canadian
territories.
The Convention Between the Government of Canada and the Government of
the French Republic on the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters and Mutual Legal Assistance in Maintenance was signed
in June 1996. It is not yet in force as neither Canada nor France has yet adopted
the necessary domestic implementing legislation.
The United Kingdom signed with Australia on August 23, 1990 an Agree-
ment providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in
Civil and Commercial Matters. See Agreement Between the Government of the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of
Australia Providing for the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, Aug. 23, 1990, 1995 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 45 (Cmd.
2896). It seems that the convention has not yet been brought into effect. Cf
Caryn Mackenzie, England and Wales, in ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
150 (Dennis Campbell ed., 1997).
The United Kingdom and the United States began in the early 1970s bilat-
eral negotiations for a Convention on the Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement
of Judgments in Civil Matters that was designed, inter alia, to take advantage of
Article 59. An ad referendum text was initialed in 1976. Ultimately, the negotia-
tions broke down, due in large measure to concerns respecting product-liability
claims on the part of U.K. manufacturers and the U.K. insurance industry. See
von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, supra note 2, at
273-74; PETER NORTH, ESSAYS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 213-14 (1993).
13. Brussels Convention, supra note 1, art. 4 (emphasis added); Lugano Con-
vention, supra note 6, art. 4 (emphasis added).
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gressive step that has occurred in international recognition
and enforcement practice in this century."14 Clearly, the
Hague Conference cannot follow the lead of the Brussels and
Lugano so far as defendants not domiciled in a Contracting
State are concerned.
II. THE ADVANTAGES OFFERED BY A TWO-DIMENSIONAL
APPROACH TO JURISDICTION AND RECOGNITION
CONVENTIONS
A. In General
Without prejudice to whether a mixed or a pure double
convention is preferable, is a two-dimensional approach superi-
or to a one-dimensional one where jurisdiction to adjudicate
and enforcement of foreign judgments are in question?
By incorporating significant elements of duality, a conven-
tion can clarify considerably the positions in international
litigation of plaintiffs and defendants alike. Consulting the
convention, plaintiffs can determine with relative ease and
accuracy where they can bring an action capable of generating
a judgment assured of recognition and enforcement in States
parties to the convention. On the other hand, defendants can
know in which convention States they cannot be sued. Accord-
ingly, basic information needed to make litigation decisions is
more accessible to both parties than under a convention simple
regulating only recognition and enforcement. 5 In particular,
"double" conventions provide clear, easily accessible informa-
tion as to where an action can be brought and where it cannot
be. (Pure double conventions enjoy here, of course, an infor-
mational advantage over mixed conventions since the latter's
permitted jurisdictional bases are one-dimensional in charac-
ter.)
A further advantage that both types of two-dimensional
conventions offer when well designed is a regime more evenly
balanced between plaintiffs and defendants than that provided
by one-dimensional recognition conventions. The latter afford
14. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Sister.State Judgments, supra
note 2, at 1060.
15. One-dimensional conventions dealing with jurisdiction to adjudicate are not
considered specifically in the discussion that follows; they have little attraction and
are not encountered in practice.
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defendants no protection where a judgment can be enforced in
the State of origin or in another State under the latter's gener-
al-non-convention-law of recognition and enforcement. On
the other hand, to the extent that a convention is dual in na-
ture, at the minimum it aborts actions based on exorbitant
bases of jurisdiction and thus protects defendants not only in
the putative State of origin but also in third States not parties
to the convention.
The two-dimensional approach-whether in a pure or a
mixed form-offers as well significant informational advantag-
es that a one-dimensional recognition convention cannot pro-
vide. The latter is silent as to which states can exercise adjudi-
catory authority in given circumstances; in order to answer
this basic question, a party must analyze the legislation and
the case law of each state with respect to which the issue aris-
es.
Obtaining recognition and enforcement abroad tends to be
a more central and difficult issue for plaintiffs than defen-
dants. Plaintiffs, by bringing an action, consent to the forum's
exercise of adjudicatory authority; accordingly, where judgment
is for the defendant, normally an objection to the court's exer-
cise of jurisdiction cannot be made and the jurisdictional re-
quirements for recognition and enforcement are satisfied. Adju-
dicatory authority over defendants can, of course, rest on con-
sent; for example, the parties may have agreed upon a forum-
selection clause. Typically, however, plaintiffs must establish a
basis for adjudicatory authority over defendants that turns on
a relationship between either a party (usually the defendant)
or the underlying controversy and the forum. A one-dimension-
al convention thus provides information respecting jurisdiction-
al requirements for recognition purposes that is vital for the
plaintiff in selecting the forum but, at least at this stage, of
relatively little help to the defendant since he does not control
the choice of forum.
Of course, when a successful plaintiff seeks recognition
and enforcement abroad, the defendant may benefit from these
requirements. The thrust of contemporary recognition conven-
tions is, however, to render judgments more easily and fully
enforceable abroad in light of the increasing globalization of
economic and social relationships. Overall, one-dimensional
recognition conventions thus offer considerably more to plain-
tiffs than to defendants. For reasons suggested above, two-
[Vol. XXIV:I
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dimensional conventions, whether pure or mixed, allocate ad-
vantage more equally between the parties.
B. Pure and Mixed Double Conventions: Comparative
Advantages
Is then the pure double-convention model feasible for a
recognition convention designed to be world-wide in scope?
And, if so, are such a convention's synergies-or those of a
mixed convention-more likely to result in a well balanced and
useful instrument?
At first blush, the full fledged double-convention model has
a strong appeal. Such conventions give the parties more com-
plete information respecting litigational possibilities. Moreover,
at least in theory, a double convention can provide an appro-
priately limited number of required jurisdictional bases that
strike a fair balance between the claim of plaintiffs to reason-
ably convenient and accessible forums in which to seek justice
and the claim of defendants that limits be set to the advantage
that plaintiffs enjoy because they control forum-selection. Since
only required jurisdictional bases can be invoked, such a con-
vention can in theory ensure a more appropriate balance be-
tween the positions of plaintiffs and defendants than can a
mixed convention. The attractiveness of a true double conven-
tion thus depends in considerable measure on the appropriate-
ness and fairness of the jurisdictional bases that it provides.
Were international conventions drafted by Solons speaking
for utopian republics, a pure double convention could perhaps
be undertaken in the confidence that the theoretically best-or
next best-solution would be achieved. In the real world, how-
ever, the drafters of a double convention will be severely
tempted to achieve agreement by accepting each others' mar-
ginal jurisdictional bases. When the stark choice between can-
onizing and demonizing a basis for assuming adjudicatory
authority is faced, it is more likely than not that either un-
qualified acceptance will be given to a significant number of
bases whose merit is dubious or the negotiations will break
down.
The considerations that can lead to the breakdown of nego-
tiations for a double convention are not limited to insistence on
the acceptance of jurisdictional bases of marginal quality. In
addition, one legal order may have strong reasons for claiming
19981
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adjudicatory authority while another has, from its perspective,
strong reasons for refusing recognition of the resulting judg-
ment. The likelihood and intensity of such tension increase as
a function of the differences between the social, sociological,
political, and economic cultures of the legal orders in question.
In groupings of states that have relatively common back-
grounds and cultures, these conflicts can often be resolved in
favor of unqualified acceptance or unqualified rejection of the
basis in question; this is especially so where the states aspire
to a more closely knit legal, economic, and political order.
World-wide, however, in many cases these tensions will be
too deeply rooted to be resolved in the either-or fashion that a
true double convention requires. Arguably, by introducing a
general choice-of-law test and by a broad and lax conception of
ordre public one could reduce the stringency of a full-fledged
double convention sufficiently to make the approach acceptable
in a world-wide convention. Such cures would, however, de-
prive the resulting convention of much of its value: A choice-of-
law test introduces complexity and uncertainty at the stage of
recognition and enforcement; an expansive conception of ordre
public unbridles judicial discretion.
A strict duality approach in a world-wide convention also
carries with it a practical difficulty worth noting: States adopt-
ing such a convention would typically experience complications
resulting from the co-existence of two quite different regimes
regulating exercises of adjudicatory authority-one for litiga-
tion generally, the other for litigation falling under the conven-
tion. This situation would lead to complications and confusion.
In light of the difficulty-perhaps impossibility-of draft-
ing, at least for world-wide use, an acceptable double conven-
tion, a more nuanced and less comprehensive application of the
duality principle has considerable attraction.
Strict adherence to duality requires that a convention
divide all possible bases for assertions of adjudicatory authori-
ty into two-and only two-groups: Bases for exercising adjudi-
catory authority that are acceptable and, conversely, bases that
are not. A more flexible approach divides jurisdictional bas-
es-like Caesar's Gaul-into three parts: required, permitted,
and prohibited. States could-but would be free not to-make
permitted-as distinguished from required-bases available
but judgments resting on a permitted basis would not be enti-
tled to recognition and enforcement under the convention.
[Vol. XXlV:I
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Instead, the enforceability vel non of judgments resting on
such bases would be handled, as has traditionally been the
case internationally, under the addressed State's general law
of recognition and enforcement. 6
In a mixed convention the pressure to include marginal
bases in the required list is far less than in a double conven-
tion; bases that are seen as marginal or problematic need nei-
ther be canonized by placing them on the required list nor
demonized by placing them on the prohibited list. Their ambiv-
alent quality is instead recognized. The educational effect of a
mixed convention on general thinking respecting the appropri-
ate scope of adjudicatory authority is, therefore, more construc-
tive than that of a full-fledged double convention. In addition,
states would be free to make permitted bases available where
they had strong reasons for claiming adjudicatory authority
but the resulting judgments could be denied recognition by
other Contracting States.
A mixed convention has a beneficial incentive effect that a
double convention lacks; it encourages the use in practice of
sound, rather than marginal, jurisdictional bases. A pure dou-
ble convention provides no incentive for a plaintiff to avoid
using a marginal required basis since all required bases yield
judgments entitled to recognition and enforcement under the
convention. Under a mixed convention, on the other hand, a
plaintiff who proceeds on a permitted basis that would be a
required basis in a double convention, cannot enforce the re-
sulting judgment under the convention.
A further advantage of the mixed-convention approach is
that-in comparison with a double-convention approach-fewer
-complications are produced by the coexistence of two regimes
regulating exercises of adjudicatory authority. The bases of
permitted jurisdiction remain the same regardless whether the
convention is invoked; accordingly, drastic revision of the
state's existing law of jurisdiction is not required. Of course, to
the extent that a state's general law had previously not provid-
ed a required basis, the basis would have to be added-either
as an effect of ratifying the convention or in implementing
16. A possible refinement would allow states to agree bilaterally that the use
by one of certain permitted bases would yield judgments entitled to recognition by
the other under the convention. Bilateralization has, of course, its own difficulties.
1998]
BROOK. J. INTL L.
legislation-to the State's jurisdictional repertoire for litiga-
tions falling within the convention's scope. Likewise, where the
convention applies, a State would be under an international
obligation to forgo use of prohibited jurisdictional bases. For
the rest, however, each State's general law of jurisdiction can
remain undisturbed.
Because of its flexible format, a balanced and acceptable
mixed convention should be draftable. Such a convention offers
reliable, low-cost information to plaintiffs and defendants and
would improve their lot generally. By designating required and
prohibited jurisdictional bases, it would also both encourage
the use of higher quality bases and protect defendants against
various exorbitant claims of adjudicatory authority. Over time,
a well designed mixed-convention should have as well a dis-
tinctly beneficial effect on general thinking and practice re-
specting the exercise of adjudicatory authority and the enforce-
ment of foreign judgments.
II. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Adopting the mixed-convention approach would, of course,
leave many difficult issues unresolved; these arise, however, as
well for pure double-conventions and are, if anything, even
more intractable in that setting. For example, to what ex-
tent-if at all-will forum non conveniens stays or dismissals
be allowed when a required jurisdictional basis is in question?
Will the convention accept the lis pendens principle and, if so,
how will it apply to proceedings seeking declaratory judg-
ments? Should the convention prohibit anti-suit injunctions?
What measure of recognition will be accorded judgments
awarding punitive or multiple damages? If certain conditions
are satisfied, should a state be permitted to enforce, but in a
reduced amount, damage awards that are, under its standards,
grossly excessive? Finally, is there any way to deal effectively
with a concern that arises with all recognition conventions that
are, in principle, open to every interested State: Should-and
can-a degree of protection be afforded the judgment debtor
when enforcement is sought for a judgment emanating from a
State, party to the convention, whose administration of justice
is regarded as falling, at least on occasion, below international-
ly acceptable standards?
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Types of Foreign Judgments Recognition Conventions
State of Origin No Convention
F-1
* F-I may assumejurisdiction on -
these bases Uncertain Am
* F-I law determines
Convention Simple
F-I may assumejurisdiction on - List of Permitted Bases
these bases
F-l may assumejurisdiction on - Uncertain Area
other bases determined by its law
* F-I required to assume -
jurisdiction only on these bases
and no others
" F-I required not to assume -
jurisdiction on other bases
* Brussels/Lugano (Art. 3) describe .
certain prohibited bases; list is
not exhaustive
* F-I required to assume -
jurisdiction on these bases
(subject to forum non conveniens
exception to the extent permitted
by Convention)
SF-I may assumejurisdiction
on other bases: F-I law
determines
* F-I required not to assume
jurisdiction on these bases
Convention Double
6List 
of RequirdBss
Mixed Convention
List of Required Bases
Permitted Bases
State of Recognition
F-2
4 F-2 may enforce judgments when
jurisdiction on these bases
4 F-2 law determines
- - F-2 reuird to enforcejudgments when
jurisdiction on these bases
4- * F-2 may enforce judgments when
jurisdiction on these bases: F-2 law
determines
(1971 Hni do.s reidors fr fed&d
b- ef..tkb F-2r =e is ef-e)
4 F-2 required to enforcejudgments
when jurisdiction assumed on these
bases
4 F-2 not required to enforce judgments
when F-I proceeds tojudgment on a
prohibited basis
4 F-2 equired to enforce judgments
when jurisdiction is determined to
have rested on a required basis
- F-2 may. but is not required, to enforce
judgments wherejurisdiction rested on
a permitted base: F-2 law determines
F-2 determines whether the
judgment rests on a prohibited basis
and, if so, is required not to enforce
I All basu ret listed as Required n Prohibited.5
All bs not Is"d es Required or Prehibited ore Pcrnitedb t(Prepared by Peter D. Troobo)March 1998
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